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MORPHING CASE BOUNDARIES IN MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS 
Margaret S. Thomas∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The boundaries of federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) are blurring, as 
district courts seek innovative ways to facilitate global settlements to resolve 
multijurisdictional, multidimensional, national mass torts. The techniques 
emerging from the district courts have mostly evaded appellate review and 
received little scholarly attention, but they raise important challenges to 
traditional understandings of the nature of MDL and complex litigation. This 
Article argues that factually similar cases proceeding in multiple court systems 
in mass tort disputes create a “federalism problem” for global settlements: 
global settlements typically benefit from oversight by a single judge, but often 
there is no single judge who can exercise control over all the parties who 
might participate in such a settlement. This Article identifies a trend emerging 
in MDL settlements that attempts to solve the federalism problem by extending 
the MDL court’s authority. In the settlement phase, some MDL judges have 
begun experimenting with the exercise of power over state litigants (and even 
individuals who made private claims but never filed suit in any court), in order 
to facilitate global settlements. In this situation, the “case” appears to 
encompass the national mass tort settlement itself. This Article concludes that 
the aggregative trend toward transjurisdictional settlement authority in MDL 
has no basis in the MDL statute. The emerging practice submerges the 
federalism problem into the settlement agreement without regard to the 
inherent limitations on the federal court’s structural power, but the federalism 
problem remains unsolved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade ago, Professor Erichson observed that complex litigation 
finds ways to aggregate itself.1 His observation remains true: innovative forms 
of aggregation in multidistrict litigation (MDL) are developing to achieve 
global peace in complex litigation.2 Among the most important of these 
innovations are transjurisdictional global settlements under the authority of the 
MDL court,3 affecting claimants outside the MDL, including private claimants 
who never filed lawsuits. 
The important disaggregative innovations identified by Professor Dodge in 
her article pose a challenge to the conventional understanding of complex 
litigation.4 The private claims settlement facilities she identifies as postdispute 
“disaggregative mechanisms” promise to expedite payment to persons harmed 
by mass torts by resolving individual claims privately, outside the court 
systems.5 As she points out, they are defendant-designed private alternatives to 
litigation, and they seek to allow defendants to get out of mass tort liability 
quickly and cheaply.6 However, early experiments with such devices suggest 
these private claims resolution mechanisms have difficulty resolving mass torts 
without intervention from public courts.7 
MDL and aggregate settlements remain the primary path to global peace in 
complex litigation. This Response thus focuses on how MDL helps foster 
global settlements, the forces that drive these settlements toward aggregation, 
and the structural difficulties posed by mass tort litigation spanning multiple 
court systems. 
 
 1 Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination 
Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 469 (2000). 
 2 See infra Part I.  
 3 For clarity, this Response refers to the federal court presiding over the MDL as the “MDL court.” 
Some federal judges use the term “MDL transferee court” to refer to this same court (as cases are transferred to 
this court from somewhere else). See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 
74 LA. L. REV. 371, 372–73 (2014) (using the term “MDL transferee court”). This Response treats these terms 
as synonymous.  
 4 See Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1253 (2014).  
 5 Id. at 1276–77. 
 6 See id. at 1257–58. 
 7 See id. at 1262 (“[W]hile parties elect private disaggregative mechanisms because they yield better 
outcomes than the default litigation system, in many disputes a public disaggregative mechanism would offer a 
superior option.”). 
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The British Petroleum (BP) oil spill litigation provides a useful illustration 
of the shortcomings of private claims resolution systems. Recent scholarly 
scrutiny of the results obtained in the private claims facility created by BP after 
the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster has raised questions about whether private 
alternatives to litigation provide any real benefits over public litigation.8 The 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) was supposed to resolve all private claims 
against BP for the oil spill privately, without resort to any courts.9 In theory, 
this informal, private system of paying claims should have offered cost savings 
to both claimants and BP, and resulted in more efficient compensation.10 It 
failed to do either. The task of crafting a global settlement of private claims 
ultimately fell upon the federal court system because the private system was 
unable to achieve global peace. Along the way, the terms of the court-enforced 
settlement were heavily litigated (and are in fact still subject to dispute).11 
Despite the GCCF paying out over $6.2 billion to more than 220,000 
GCCF claimants in 18 months,12 the vaunted benefits of the GCCF’s private 
resolution never fully materialized—even for BP, as the defendant that 
designed it. Thousands of claimants still opted to file lawsuits instead of 
pursuing claims in the GCCF.13 These suits ultimately were consolidated in a 
very expensive, lengthy MDL in federal court.14 The document discovery 
alone involved 90 million pages of documents.15 The cost and complexity of 
the MDL caused BP to abandon its disaggregated approach seeking individual 
settlements in the GCCF and work instead toward a court-supervised mass 
settlement with the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC) in the MDL, 
ultimately resulting in two traditional aggregate settlements through the formal 
class action device.16 The settlements then spawned multiple appeals to the 
Fifth Circuit.17 The GCCF was an abject failure if its goal was for the 
 
 8 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox 
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014) (comparing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility to the class action 
settlement that replaced it, finding that the class action results in greater payments to claimants).  
 9 Id. at 400 (“Ambitiously, the GCCF set out to expeditiously resolve all of the private oil spill related 
claims against BP outside of the court system.”).  
 10 Id. at 398 (“This [GCCF] settlement . . . at least in theory, should have been the best of all worlds.”).  
 11 See discussion infra note 24. 
 12 Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 400.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. at 400–01. 
 15 Id. at 401. 
 16 See id.; see also Dodge, supra note 4, at 1312 (discussing class settlement).  
 17 In re Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370, 373–74 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
interpretation of the settlement agreement, and recounting the byzantine procedural history). Interpretation of 
the BP settlement was first appealed to the Fifth Circuit in 2013, remanded with instructions for the district 
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defendant to avoid the transaction costs of aggregate settlements: these 
transaction costs have been estimated to have cost BP $600 million.18 
Despite these transaction costs, the highly contested, court-administered 
aggregate settlements in the Deepwater Horizon case appear to have generated 
better results for the plaintiffs than the GCCF—though BP has vigorously 
disputed the interpretation of the settlement agreement yielding those results.19 
New research by Professors Issacharoff and Rave suggests the GCCF 
claimants generally received significantly smaller payments than those 
participating in the aggregate settlements.20 The aggregate public litigation 
thus generated higher compensation than private claims resolution, despite 
higher transaction costs.21 They observe this creates a paradox that challenges 
the conventional economic theory that lowered transaction costs should benefit 
both parties.22 In fact, their analysis shows public litigation produced better 
results for injured parties, even though it was much more complicated and 
expensive.23 Quite simply, aggregate litigation in federal court appears to have 
been worth the trouble and cost to bring.24 This suggests that dysfunctions 
within private claims facilities identified by Professor Dodge appear to be 
real,25 and the benefits may be illusory. 
 
court to reconsider certain data in calculating “Business and Economic Loss,” then returned to the Fifth Circuit 
in a second appeal. Id. While the interpretation of the settlement agreement was pending before one panel of 
the Fifth Circuit, a different panel of the same court also considered a separate appeal of the certification of the 
class by the district court. Id. at 374; see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming class certification).  
 18 See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 402 (observing the BP class action settlements included a 
$600 million reserve fund to cover fees to private counsel, costs of class notice, and discovery in the MDL).  
 19 See discussion supra note 17 (recounting the litigation regarding the interpretation of the settlement 
agreement). 
 20 Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 402, 406 fig.1 (depicting a comparison of claim valuations in the 
GCCF and class settlement); id. at 413 (“We have been unable to find any significant category of recovery in 
which claimants did better under the GCCF than under the scheduled payments of the class settlement.”). 
 21 See id. at 402. 
 22 Id. at 403. 
 23 See id. at 402. 
 24 The ultimate success of the court-administered settlement is not yet final, though the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement. At the time of this writing, BP has sought 
en banc review, and may yet seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. On March 17, 2014, BP filed a petition 
to have the entire Fifth Circuit review the terms of the settlement agreement en banc, after losing before a 
three-judge panel of that court. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc for Appellants BP Exploration & 
Production Inc., BP America Production Co., and BP P.L.C. at 5–6, In re Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370 
(5th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-30315), available at https://www.thestateofthegulf.com/media/67350/2014-03-17-
Petition-for-Rehearing-En-Banc-for-Appellants-BP-Exploration-.pdf. 
 25 See Dodge, supra note 4, at 1300–01, 1305.  
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The GCCF experience shows that such private resolution devices are likely 
to be inadequate to achieve global peace without intervention from the courts 
and some form of aggregate settlement—at least in “elastic” cases with vast 
numbers of undefined plaintiffs.26 Instead of “radically upending the traditional 
view that aggregation was the only way to resolve mass claims,”27 flaws in the 
GCCF demonstrated the necessity of both public litigation and aggregation to 
resolve elastic mass torts. Disaggregative private claims facilities, like the one 
used by BP, thus have to be understood in the context of their relationship to 
MDL, and the elusive quest for global peace in complex litigation. 
This Response identifies a trend toward transjurisdictional aggregation in 
MDL mass torts settlements that runs counter to the disaggregative trend 
identified by Professor Dodge and other scholars.28 MDL courts are finding 
ways in the settlement phase to collectively resolve staggering numbers of 
claims in nationwide, transjurisdictional mass settlements. These mass 
settlements are becoming more aggregated, not less, even when Rule 23 class 
certification is unavailable. Some of the same problems with class litigation 
that are producing the disaggregative trend Professor Dodge identifies in the 
private sector appear to be producing the opposite trend in MDL.29 A new form 
 
 26 See Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
871, 888 (2001) (defining elasticity in mass torts to refer, at least in part, to “the undefined nature and number 
of plaintiffs”). Elasticity creates special difficulties in resolving mass tort litigation. Professor McGovern has 
aptly observed that claims resolution facilities that are especially efficient tend to then result in additional 
claims being filed:  
In litigation terms, if the supply is the number of cases processed by the system and cost is the 
transaction cost of that processing, then an elastic mass tort would have an increase in filings, 
whereas an inelastic mass tort would not. Aircraft crash cases are, for example, inelastic; asbestos 
cases are highly elastic. Since only 10–20% of all actionable torts result in litigation, there is a 
universe that remains unfiled. If there is a claims resolution facility that processes claims quickly 
and at low costs, one can anticipate a much higher filing rate than one would otherwise expect in 
the tort system. These larger numbers of claims can create a major dilution of benefits, 
particularly if they are accompanied by large numbers of false positives that cannot be 
eliminated.  
Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1383 n.66 
(2005) [hereinafter McGovern, The What and Why].  
 27 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1316.  
 28 See id. at 1257 & n.14 (discussing scholarship focusing on smaller class actions and disaggregation).  
 29 It may be useful to clarify what is meant by “aggregation” and “disaggregation” for purposes of this 
article. True, formal aggregation traditionally involved the joinder of parties or certification of class actions. 
See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 1, at 409. There are, however, myriad other ways suits can be partially 
aggregated for group resolution, whether formally in court or informally through coordination. See generally 
Erichson, supra note 1. This contrasts with disaggregation, which emphasizes the separateness of parties, 
claims, defenses, and remedies. See Dodge, supra note 4, at 1257. 
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of MDL settlement is emerging that is increasingly aggregative, and sometimes 
even operating transjurisdictionally to control all claims related to a mass tort, 
regardless of whether they are part of the MDL. 
The relationship between the BP MDL and the private claims resolution 
facility illustrates the aggregative pressure exerted by MDL settlements. 
Thousands of people and businesses affected by the oil spill brought separate 
state and federal lawsuits, and thousands more settled their individual claims 
through the GCCF.30 The MDL court ultimately not only supervised the global 
settlement of the claims filed in federal court, but it also exercised control of 
the GCCF settlements and even some claims filed in state court.31 It initially 
assessed 4%–6% of the gross amount of all settlements to create a common 
benefit fund to pay for work by attorneys that benefitted in some general sense 
all plaintiffs—applying the assessment not only to claims that were part of the 
MDL when settled, but also some state court cases and GCCF claims.32 The 
non-MDL claimants in state court (or the GCCF) had not necessarily opted 
into any global settlement or consented to be part of the MDL—nor even filed 
individual actions in or been removed to federal court. They had merely 
brought claims that were part of the same mass tort. When these claimants had 
negotiated their own individual, separate settlements with BP, a fraction of 
their individual settlements flowed into the MDL for redistribution by the 
federal court as part of the aggregate settlement. The private disaggregative 
device of the GCCF thus appears to have been subsumed by the MDL court’s 
conception of its power over the “litigation,” as the court exercised control 
over it. 
The parties who settled individually outside the MDL mass settlement thus 
suffered a double blow: they generally received less money from BP, and some 
of them still had to pay for common benefit work performed in the MDL.33 
 
 30 See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex. on Apr. 20, 2010 (Oil 
Spill I), MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 6817982, at *3, *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011); see also Dodge, supra note 4, 
at 1256 & n.8 (discussing the GCCF).  
 31 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that BP worked with the PSC 
“to transfer claims from the GCCF to a program supervised directly by the district court”); In re Deepwater 
Horizon, 732 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In March 2012, the district court granted the parties’ request to 
implement a process to transfer claims from the GCCF to a court-supervised program that the parties agreed to 
in principle.”); Oil Spill I, 2011 WL 6817982, at *1, *6; Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 400–02. 
 32 See Oil Spill I, 2011 WL 6817982, at *1, *3, *5. The court later modified this to exempt GCCF 
claimants but not state court claimants. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex. on Apr. 20, 2010 (Oil Spill II), MDL No. 2179, 2012 WL 161194, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 33 See, e.g., Oil Spill II, 2012 WL 161194, at *1 (ordering defendants to withhold 4% of gross 
settlements, judgments, or other payments to government entities to deposit into a common benefit fund); id. at 
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They gambled on higher payments for less cost, and they lost on both counts. 
This was because BP apparently agreed to pay a premium to get out of the 
class actions.34 Professors Issacharoff and Rave have demonstrated through the 
BP settlements that defendants sometimes will pay the higher transaction costs 
associated with aggregate litigation because they “want peace, and they are 
often willing to pay for it.”35 Indeed, MDL defendants often appear quite 
willing to pay for that peace through mass settlements, even without the utility 
of Rule 23. 
In the past, the prospect of global peace was once likely to be maximized 
through aggregated settlements under Rule 23.36 The prospect of certifying 
nationwide classes or settlement-only classes in mass torts has waned;37 
however, MDL judges have responded with creative solutions to wrangle as 
many claimants as possible into mass settlements. As reliance on Rule 23 has 
diminished, MDL has ascended as the most important federal procedural 
 
*2 (ordering defendants to withhold 6% of same for any other plaintiff or claimant); Issacharoff & Rave, supra 
note 8, at 413.  
 34 See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 404–12. 
 35 Id. at 413. They argue there are thresholds of settlement participation that represent enhanced value to 
defendants, even when the participation obtained is not total. Id. at 415–16.  
 36 The controversial aggregate settlement of personal injury claims belonging to anyone exposed to 
Agent Orange in Vietnam was one of the earliest cases to demonstrate the power of Rule 23 to impose global 
peace. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming the adequacy 
of notice to “[a]nyone who believed that he or she had suffered injury as a result of exposure to Agent Orange 
in Vietnam”); see also Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action 
Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 731–32 (2006) (reviewing the terms of the Agent Orange class action 
settlement); id. at 734 (observing the impact the Agent Orange class action had on reshaping mass tort 
litigation); id. at 735 (reporting that, after Agent Orange, federal courts began approving aggregate settlements 
in other mass tort contexts). Rule 23 was also used to craft a global settlement in the Dalkon Shield product 
liability litigation, another early example of aggregate resolution of personal injury claims. In re A.H. Robins 
Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Bloom, supra, at 735. The floodgates then opened and other cases followed. 
See Bloom, supra, at 735–36. Indeed, during this period, class treatment of settlements was sometimes 
prompted by defendants seeking global peace. Id. at 746–47.  
 37 After the Court’s decisions in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), attempts to use the class action device under Rule 23 to aggregate 
nationwide mass tort claims to facilitate global settlements have been increasingly doomed because federal 
courts often decline to certify such classes. See Bloom, supra note 36, at 747; Samuel Issacharoff, Private 
Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 208 (“As a result, class actions seemed to drop out of the 
available set of tools for attempting to settle most mass torts . . . .”); see also Jeremy Hays, The Quasi–Class 
Action Model for Limiting Attorneys’ Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 601 
(2012) (discussing the waning utility of class actions under Rule 23 and the imperfect nature of MDL as a 
replacement). This demise of class actions was long heralded by scholars. See Charles Silver, Comparing 
Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 500 (1991) (observing in the early 1990s that it was 
already true that narrow interpretation of class action rules made it difficult for district judges “to craft tort 
class actions that survive review”).  
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device to aggregate (and settle) mass torts.38 Indeed, by one estimate, as much 
as 15% of all civil litigation in the federal courts is MDL.39 
While MDL may involve judge-created ad hoc aggregative devices that are 
powerful, flexible, and effective in settling mass torts, it paradoxically does so 
in a way that nominally emphasizes the disaggregated nature of individual suits 
filed by separate plaintiffs, transferred into the MDL. Increasingly at the 
settlement stage, MDL also emphasizes the unitary nature of “the litigation,” 
treating a mass settlement as a proxy for a “case.” 
Though MDL’s unifying power is emerging as a way to effectuate global 
settlements, MDL nevertheless is defined by statute as a procedural device 
composed of individual lawsuits, with separate claimants.40 It thus has an 
inherently disaggregative quality. Traditionally, all individual claimants have 
to personally opt in to any proposed MDL mass settlement, legitimizing it 
through personal consent.41 The separate nature of the cases transferred to the 
MDL potentially also creates barriers to efficiency through limits on federal 
jurisdiction: additional separate cases are nearly always filed in state court, and 
some of them may be nonremovable.42 When mass torts spawn cases in 
multiple state courts and in federal court, aggregative mechanisms can 
founder.43 
Modern mass tort “litigation” thus often has several courts with power over 
various plaintiffs who comprise the litigation’s components. This means that 
there may be no single court that is well positioned to facilitate and administer 
the global settlement of the “litigation.” Parallel proceedings create a dilemma 
for parties in the march toward global settlements: who will oversee the global 
settlement, if no single court has power over all the settling parties? 
 
 38 Fallon, supra note 3, at 372–73 (observing the increasing significance of MDL). 
 39 Id. at 373 (citing John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL 
Process, LITIGATION, Spring 2012, at 26). 
 40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 41 See McGovern, The What and Why, supra note 26, at 1377 (discussing consent of the settlement 
beneficiaries as a vehicle for achieving legitimacy of the claims resolution facility). 
 42 Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.31 (2004) (discussing federal jurisdictional 
boundaries in MDL litigation). 
 43 Erichson, supra note 1, at 415 (“[A] state court action cannot be consolidated with a federal court 
action unless the state court action is first removed to federal court, which in many cases cannot be 
accomplished. Due to these restrictions, consolidation has limited utility as a method of aggregating dispersed 
cases.” (footnote omitted)).  
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This dilemma has become “the federalism problem” of complex litigation, 
and the problem is magnified in the post–class action era. The federalism 
problem is fundamental to understanding the radical form of transjurisdictional 
aggregation emerging in MDL. The emerging breed of MDL settlement 
responds to the federalism problem by redefining the MDL court as a 
transjurisdictional settlement manager. 
The emergence of transjurisdictional MDL mass settlements has lacked 
attention from scholars and appellate courts. The trend has evolved slowly, 
beneath the surface of aggregate litigation. While scholarly and appellate 
attention has been focused on Rule 23, these transjurisdictional MDL 
settlements have quietly asserted control over billions of dollars worth of 
claims in state and federal courts, aggregating on a massive scale at the 
settlement stage using ad hoc mechanisms, usually with the consent of the 
parties. The emerging transjurisdictional MDL settlement trend has the 
potential to subsume not only federal cases but also state cases that could not 
be brought in federal court, and sometimes absorbs private claims not brought 
in any court, and even controls other independently created, private claims 
facilities.44 
This Response attempts to fill that void by identifying the emergence of 
these transjurisdictional mass settlements, where federal MDL judges 
operating to effect global settlements, sometimes beyond the federal court 
system. Part I thus traces the evolution of the new form of MDL settlement. 
Part II situates that evolution within Congress’s limitation on MDL power and 
locates the federalism problem submerged within this emerging form of 
aggregation. 
This Response suggests that the innovations in MDL courts regarding 
global settlements reflect the emergence of a new understanding of the “case” 
in complex litigation⎯one that purports to transcend individual parties and 
their claims and encompasses entire transjurisdictional disputes over mass 
torts. It argues that this new breed of MDL functions only through 
acquiescence of other courts⎯particularly state judges. Instead of solving the 
 
 44 Professor Dodge identifies such private claims facilities as emerging disaggregative mechanisms. See 
Dodge, supra note 4, at 1272. 
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federalism problem in mass tort litigation, it buries it in acquiescence and 
consent.45 
I. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS 
Although the MDL procedure emerged from the federal courts’ experience 
in the 1960s with antitrust cases involving electrical equipment manufacturers, 
Congress envisioned the procedure having utility in a wide range of subject 
areas⎯including airplane crashes, intellectual property, products liability, and 
securities suits.46 That vision has largely been fulfilled, as MDL has been 
widely utilized in a broad range of subject matters.47 Mass torts,48 however, 
have been by far the most difficult kinds of cases to organize in MDLs: with 
many people injured in different places, cases multiply in state and federal 
courts, often defying efforts to consolidate them due to the lack of removability 
of some of the state cases.49 The federalism problem has thus been a 
fundamental, structural feature of elastic mass tort litigation, where there are 
multiple court systems with power over different parties in the same mass tort 
dispute. 
In federal court, consolidation is usually straightforward. Once the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) orders the creation of an MDL, 
§ 1407 provides specific powers to district courts on the receiving end of a 
transfer from the JPML to conduct “coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
 
 45 This Article does not address the limits on MDL subject matter jurisdiction at the settlement stage, or 
how broadly the U.S. Constitution might allow the MDL courts to define the “constitutional case” (in the sense 
of the litigation unit). Those questions are the subject of a forthcoming follow-up article by this author. 
 46 H.R. REP. NO. 1130, at 2–3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899–1900; see also In re 
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing and quoting 
the legislative history of the MDL statute). 
 47 See JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2012, at 12 (2013), available 
at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2012.pdf (noting that as of 
December 31, 2012, pending MDLs included cases related to products liability, sales practices, securities, air 
and other disasters, antitrust, contracts, employment practices, and intellectual property). 
 48 Although “mass torts” is a flexible term, it is generally understood to encompass situations where 
many people are injured either from a single accident or event, or use of or exposure to the same product, and 
each has a claim for individual damages. See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-class 
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 164–65 (2004) (discussing 
the definition, and four categories: mass accidents, dispersed/personal injury mass torts, property damage mass 
torts, and economic loss torts). 
 49 See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in 
State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1691–95 (1992). 
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proceedings.”50 The structure of MDL thus requires a single federal transferee 
judge to oversee hundreds, or thousands, or tens of thousands of factually 
related individual cases filed in many federal district courts across the United 
States.51 Meanwhile, parties litigating in nonremovable state court actions 
move forward in parallel proceedings separately from the MDL. 
Although MDL was created by federal statute in 1968,52 it remains one of 
the least studied types of federal litigation, receiving scant attention from 
scholars or the Supreme Court, even as it has become the federal procedural 
“work horse” in resolving mass torts.53 Perhaps this may be due to the relative 
success of the MDL model: large MDLs generate very little appellate 
precedent,54 particularly compared to class actions. The model encourages (and 
often successfully achieves) settlement,55 without the procedural opportunities 
to challenge aggregation that are present in Rule 23 for class actions, as there is 
no class certification process present in the MDL, and likely no opportunity for 
appeal. 
MDL is sometimes classified as a form of aggregate litigation,56 but it 
exists as a hybrid that is both aggregate and disaggregate at the same time. 
According to § 1407, it consists of separately filed lawsuits transferred for 
consolidated, pretrial proceedings.57 In practice, it may use bellwether trials of 
selected individual cases (illustrating the disaggregated essence of those 
cases),58 then translate the results into rational settlement valuations for a mass 
 
 50 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). The meaning of “coordinated or consolidated” proceedings has received 
scant attention from MDL courts, even when it impacts their decision-making. Cf. In re Equity Funding Corp. 
of Am. Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (J.P.M.L. 1973) (“We have repeatedly declined to attempt to 
determine in what way and to what extent the litigation should be coordinated or consolidated. From the very 
beginning we have left that determination to the discretion of the transferee judge.” (emphasis added)). 
 51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)–(b). 
 52 Id. § 1407. 
 53 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical 
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 906 (2001) (concluding that MDL in mass tort cases facilitates 
“the growth of mass tort litigation” despite contractions in availability of class certification).  
 54 Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1770 
(2005) (“Because settlements in non-class actions need no court approval, they rarely generate reported 
decisions. In addition, confidentiality agreements frequently prevent publication of settlement terms. For both 
of these reasons, aggregate settlements tend to fly under the radar of most observers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 55 See Hensler, supra note 53, at 894 (“[C]ollecting and transferring like claims to a single judge often 
encourages settlement of these claims, which may be the real goal of the parties requesting multi-districting.”). 
 56 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 4, at 1256. 
 57 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 58 Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2344 (2008). 
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settlement of remaining claims (operating in aggregated fashion),59 which 
requires individual claimants to opt into the settlement (returning their 
disaggregated identity),60 while overseeing compensation of the group of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who brokered the settlement (much like class counsel in 
aggregated litigation).61 Judges may order individual discovery over some 
issues, while relying on collective discovery for others.62 They may create a 
streamlined, unitary process for filing claims, while insisting those claims 
specify facts that would be relevant to individual defenses.63 
MDL, like traditional class actions, generally operates at the settlement 
stage using a claims resolution facility created by a settlement agreement.64 
These facilities entail the defendants’ funding of assets from which to pay 
plaintiffs participating in the settlement, and some process to resolve large 
numbers of claims against that fund.65 Despite this resemblance to Rule 23 at 
the settlement stage, MDL operates outside the formal constraints of Rule 23. 
It requires no class certification and imposes none of the complex procedural 
protections for absent class members built into Rule 23.66 
 
 59 E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (Vioxx III), 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 760 (E.D. La. 2011); Fallon et 
al., supra note 58, at 2338. 
 60 E.g., Vioxx III, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 760–61; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2007 WL 
3354112, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007). 
 61 See generally Vioxx III, 802 F. Supp. 2d 740 (allocating common benefit attorneys’ fees). 
 62 Barbara J. Rothstein et al., A Model Mass Tort: The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 625–27 
(2006) (discussing strategies MDL courts use to manage discovery). 
 63 See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 
2006) (discussing use of case management orders); see also McGovern, The What and Why, supra note 26, at 
1388 (“Just as litigation raises different issues than do global resolutions, the type of information that parties 
seeking a global resolution may need is typically different from the individualistic, case-by-case approach of 
common law adjudication. Often there is even opposition to the collection of global data to be used in 
individual trials; a focus on the entire case can be maintained in the context of settlement without adversely 
impacting the litigation of individual cases.”). 
 64 McGovern, The What and Why, supra note 26, at 1380–81 (observing that class actions under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) and (b)(3), “state class actions, bankruptcy, [MDL], and mass settlements all reach closure with a 
claims resolution facility”). 
 65 See id. at 1361–62. 
 66 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (describing the notice required for members of a class under 
23(b)(3)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (describing the court’s role to protect class members); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e)(2) (requiring court approval of class settlements); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (permitting class members to 
object to settlement terms); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring the court to appoint and supervise class counsel); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (giving the court power over attorneys’ fees for class counsel); see also Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010) 
(observing that MDL operates as a “procedural no man’s land—somewhere in between individual litigation 
and class action litigation, but without the protections of either”). 
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This Part demonstrates that MDL judges’ understanding of the power of the 
MDL court to “coordinate and consolidate” at the settlement stage is evolving 
rapidly. In particular, some judges on the vanguard are reconceptualizing the 
relationship of the MDL to nonfederal cases pending outside the federal court. 
A controversial new form of MDL settlement is being formed by pressure to 
pave new paths to global peace. 
A. Limited Power over Individual Cases Comprising Multidistrict Litigation 
In the 1970s, when MDLs were a new phenomenon, a few early published 
cases began to sketch the scope of the MDL court’s power. Most of these cases 
reflected a narrow, formalistic view of that power.67 The scope of the MDL 
court’s power has long been analogized to the power in non-MDL cases that 
exists under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42. This rule permits a district 
court to order consolidation of separate actions involving “a common question 
of law or fact.”68 Under this view, upon transfer into the MDL, such 
consolidation before the MDL court simply creates an administrative, 
procedural “wrapper” around individual cases, with each case retaining its 
individual identity.69 Under this view, any aggregative effect is at best partial 
and limited: the MDL judge was to oversee consolidated proceedings, but the 
MDL itself was still composed of individual cases, or sometimes a collection 
of both individual cases and class actions.70 
In one early MDL, this concept was challenged when the plaintiffs jointly 
filed an amended “Unified and Consolidated Complaint” against all of the 
defendants, replacing their individual complaints.71 The district court 
understood the consolidation of pleading to be an administrative procedure to 
expedite proceedings, not a redefinition of the parties or nature of the particular 
cases.72 
This early understanding defined the MDL in terms of an administrative 
procedural wrapper containing individual cases that were transferred into the 
 
 67 During this early period in MDL history, “business was slow.” Fallon, supra note 3, at 372.  
 68 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(2); see, e.g., In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 
175 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
 69 See, e.g., In re Equity Funding, 416 F. Supp. at 176 (“[T]he effect of such pretrial consolidation is not 
and cannot be to ‘merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are 
parties in one suit parties in another.’” (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1933))). 
 70 Fallon, supra note 3, at 375 (describing the modern trend of combining class actions with individual 
actions to form MDLs). 
 71 In re Equity Funding, 416 F. Supp. at 170–71. 
 72 Id. at 176. 
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MDL. This understanding created a strict limit on the power of the MDL court: 
it extended only to those cases inside the wrapper.73 This strict limitation 
created important practical problems, as the use of common benefit funds 
became the norm in MDLs and defendants sought to settle all related cases in 
state and federal court in “global settlements.” 
As early as 1973, an MDL pending in the Northern District of California 
involving an Alaskan air crash forced the Ninth Circuit to confront the outer 
boundary of this definition of the MDL in the settlement context.74 Hartland v. 
Alaska Airlines involved more than thirty actions filed in state courts in 
Washington and Alaska,75 as well as eight more filed in federal court that were 
transferred to the MDL.76 Although the alignment of the parties and claims was 
convoluted, on the surface, the Ninth Circuit understood the federal district 
judge in the MDL to have purported to have power to “approve” the airline 
defendant’s settlement with two claimants who had asserted claims that were 
not part of the MDL.77 One of these claimants had brought suit in state court in 
Alaska; the other had filed no lawsuit in any court.78 The district judge 
nevertheless required both claimants’ counsel to deposit 5% of their 
settlements into the federal court for a common benefit fund.79 The Ninth 
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus, reversing this order for lack of jurisdiction 
over these settlements: these claims were not part of the MDL over which the 
federal judge exercised power.80 In other words, they could not be aggregated 
with the federal proceeding. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision contains little explanation, perhaps because 
the fundamental jurisdictional premises appear so self-evident.81 Both claims 
had been presented to the airline outside federal court. The case filed in Alaska 
state court had never been removed to federal court, and there would have been 
no diversity to support removal.82 The other claim had been privately presented 
 
 73 See id. at 175. 
 74 544 F.2d 992, 997–98 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 75 Id. at 994. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 994, 996–99. 
 78 Id. at 994.  
 79 Id. at 996–99. 
 80 Id. at 1001–02. 
 81 See id. at 1001. 
 82 See id. at 997. 
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to the airline, without any case ever having been filed, so no court had asserted 
jurisdiction over it.83 
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional question was a good bit more complicated 
than the opinion’s analysis suggested. The procedural history in the case shows 
that the district judge had at least a colorable basis to justify exerting control 
over the settlement: one of two plaintiffs had also separately brought a Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit in federal court, which was part of the MDL.84 
That plaintiff’s settlement with the airline not only released claims against that 
airline, but also all other claims against other defendants, including the FTCA 
claim pending in federal court, in the MDL.85 The MDL court’s exercise of 
control over the release of claims in the MDL was likely within its inherent 
power, although the Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge this. Indeed, the 
circuit’s decision to reverse the district court largely ignored the complexity of 
the question of jurisdiction over a settling claimant litigating in multiple 
jurisdictions. With scant explanation, the Ninth Circuit instead emphasized the 
separateness of the actions, holding the district court exceeded its jurisdiction 
in attempting to reach the settlement proceeds in the state litigation.86 
Hartland is nevertheless important because it illustrates that as early as 
1973, the problem of settlements in related cases pending outside the MDL had 
fully emerged. Moreover, the case reveals how thorny the problem is, when the 
same plaintiff proceeds in multiple forums against different defendants (some 
of whom are part of the MDL, and some of whom are not) and then reaches a 
comprehensive settlement involving both the state and federal action. 
Nevertheless, the opinion features a very narrow understanding of the scope of 
the MDL court’s power. 
The Hartland model of MDL provided stringent limits on the capacity of 
MDL to serve as an aggregative device. The formalistic view of the MDL as a 
procedural wrapper containing individual cases ensured the integrity of each 
plaintiff’s claim as a separate litigation unit. The Hartland model appears to 
have been relatively stable, with little reported precedent, until the early 1990s. 
In 1992, the Fourth Circuit reached a similarly narrow result in In re Showa 
Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Products Liability Litigation–II (Showa Denko).87 
 
 83 Id. at 994, 996. 
 84 Id. at 997–98. 
 85 Id. at 999. 
 86 Id. at 1001. 
 87 953 F.2d 162, 165–66 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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This MDL involved 470 federal cases, with approximately 300 defendants, in a 
pharmaceutical product liability suit.88 A district court created a common 
benefit fund for discovery by requiring each plaintiff in the United States with 
a claim to pay $1,000 into the fund, as well as 0.5% of any settlement or jury 
award.89 The district court’s reasoning was straightforward: “whether a 
plaintiff settles or litigates, he or she benefits from the discovery.”90 The PSC 
contended that the district court’s motivation was simply to compensate the 
PSC for its expenses in conducting discovery to be shared by all.91 The order 
appeared to be targeted at the practical problem of free riders (plaintiffs 
litigating outside the MDL who benefitted from the work of the PSC to reach a 
settlement, but contributed nothing to the cost of that work).92 
The district court’s order was innovative in the way it avoided the mistake 
of the district court in Hartland: instead of ordering state plaintiffs to 
contribute to the federal common benefit fund, the order instead purported to 
bind the federal defendant to certify payment of the assessment in any 
settlements reached anywhere.93 In other words, the court exercised control 
over the party before it in the MDL to control the settlement of cases outside 
the MDL. The MDL court’s order reached cases pending in other federal 
districts that had not been transferred to the MDL, as well as 683 cases in state 
court, and 180 potential claimants who had not yet even filed suit.94 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the MDL court’s order, emphasizing the 
jurisdictional limits of federal courts.95 Relying in part on the groundwork laid 
by the Ninth Circuit in Hartland, the Showa Denko opinion observed that 
§ 1407 does not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.96 Thus, the MDL 
“court’s jurisdiction . . . is limited to cases and controversies between persons 
who are properly parties to the cases transferred [to the MDL], and any attempt 
 
 88 Id. at 164. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 164–65. 
 92 The free rider problem is fundamental to MDL case management. The PSC and various other court-
appointed plaintiff committees in MDLs typically handle discovery, argue motions, appear in court, conduct 
hearings, and sometimes even conduct bellwether trials⎯work that theoretically benefits all plaintiffs in the 
MDL, but this work is not compensated while the MDL is pending. Fallon, supra note 3, at 373–74. Common 
benefit funds have thus long been used in this context to ensure this work is eventually compensated out of the 
proceeds of settlements or trial judgments in favor of MDL plaintiffs. Id. at 375–76. 
 93 Showa Denko, 953 F.2d at 164. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 165–66. 
 96 Id. 
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without service of process to reach others who are unrelated is beyond the 
court’s power.”97 The Fourth Circuit observed that the district court’s attempt 
to levy assessments against settlements outside the MDL had “the very real 
potential of interfering with discovery proceedings in state court.”98 
In the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the scope of the MDL court’s power was 
clear: the MDL court’s power extends only to the individual federal cases 
transferred into the MDL, and no further.99 The fundamental message in these 
circuits left MDL judges with a significant practical problem in complex cases 
with state and federal components: how does one broker a settlement bringing 
global peace in a complex national mass tort litigation if no single judge has 
the power to oversee that global settlement, and how will the PSC get 
compensated for its work in achieving such a settlement? 
This question has crystallized the federalism problem of MDL settlements, 
making the path to global peace in such litigation treacherous. Where litigation 
proliferates in multiple court systems, each overseeing only part of the total 
inventory of cases, bringing all of the cases under the umbrella of a global 
settlement overseen by the federal court is virtually impossible under the 
Hartland/Showa Denko view of the MDL court’s power. 
The federalism problem has grown more acute since the 1990s as it has 
become increasingly difficult to certify the type of national class actions that 
would give a federal court supervisory power over such settlements under 
Rule 23.100 MDL courts started pushing back against the stable, historical 
model of MDL power at the same time that the Supreme Court began 
constricting the availability of class settlements under Rule 23. 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 166. 
 99 The Second Circuit was an earlier outlier in its approach to the federalism problem. It endorsed the use 
of the All Writs Act to remove state litigation to federal court in Agent Orange cases when a group of plaintiffs 
claimed to have discovered their own injuries after the settlement of a federal class action had concluded. In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1430–31 (2d Cir. 1993). In other words, it purported to 
force aggregation in the federal forum. This aggressive interference with separate state litigation was 
subsequently forbidden by the U.S. Supreme Court in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 
(2002). See Chamblee, supra note 48, at 179–80 (discussing the Second Circuit’s use of the All Writs Act in 
the Agent Orange case and the subsequent reversal by the Supreme Court). 
 100 See, e.g., Silver, supra note 37, at 500 (observing in the early 1990s that it was already true that narrow 
interpretation of class action rules made it difficult for district judges “to craft tort class actions that survive 
review”); see also Hays, supra note 37, at 601 (discussing the “waning” utility of class actions under Rule 23 
and the imperfect nature of MDL as a replacement). 
THOMAS GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/10/2014 1:06 PM 
2014] MORPHING CASE BOUNDARIES 1357 
Part II.B examines the emergence of a recharacterization of the role of 
MDL judges that pushes back against narrow understandings of the scope of 
the MDL court’s power. MDL began using innovative strategies to affect (and 
sometimes even capture control over) parties outside the MDL. These 
strategies respond directly to the federalism problem. 
B. Coordination Between State and Federal Courts as an Alternative to 
Formal Aggregation 
MDLs often have thousands of parties and cases that cannot, as a practical 
matter, be individually adjudicated. The need for global settlements and 
common benefit funds is often acute—for both the parties and the court. 
Global settlements risk becoming unmanageable if no single court has the 
power to enforce them, and they risk failure if not enough plaintiffs in various 
court systems are included.101 Moreover, they require some mechanism to 
arrange compensation for common benefit work leading to the settlement—in 
whatever court system that work took place.102 
To solve this problem, MDL courts have long explored methods of 
coordinating state and federal litigation.103 Such coordination commenced as 
early as 1972 in airplane crash litigation, and continued in many other major 
cases in the 1970s and 1980s.104 
This coordination has generally been well received by commentators. The 
Manual for Complex Litigation now recommends that MDL judges 
“communicate personally with state court judges who have a significant 
number of cases in order to discuss mutual concerns and suggestions,” and 
share “pretrial orders and proposed schedules.”105 Similarly, the Conference of 
Chief Justices directed the National Center for State Courts to “take all 
available and reasonable steps to promote communication between state and 
federal courts for the purpose of establishing best practices for the management 
 
 101 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 87, 99 (2011) (“When defendants decide to settle, they want finality. They thus want to sweep as 
many plaintiffs as possible under the settlement rug.”). 
 102 See id. at 123 (noting the problem of “[fights] over common resources—such as settlement funds”). 
 103 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.31 (2004) (“State and federal judges, faced 
with the lack of a comprehensive statutory scheme, have undertaken innovative efforts to coordinate parallel or 
related litigation so as to reduce the costs, delays, and duplication of effort that often stem from such dispersed 
litigation.” (footnote omitted)); Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1700–01 (discussing early efforts to 
coordinate cases in the 1970s).  
 104 Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1700–01. 
 105 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.312. 
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of like-kind litigation that spans multiple state jurisdictions and federal 
districts.”106 
Communication, sharing, and coordination are only practically useful if a 
measure of uniformity ensues. Coordination thus likely involves some 
persuasion and influence by the MDL judges over their state court colleagues, 
urging them to follow the MDL court’s lead.107 It also creates risks of one 
court voluntarily ceding control to another.108 Scholars and judges have both 
warned that interjurisdictional judicial cooperation risks turning into a 
“collective decision” on the merits of the litigation, which threatens judicial 
independence.109 
Cooperation often occurs through ex parte communications among 
judges.110 Indeed, MDL pretrial orders sometimes reflect an implicit 
expectation that the state judges will agree to enforce the federal orders in the 
state actions. For example, in a major products liability case involving medical 
devices, when the federal court ordered a deduction from settlements for work 
and costs of the PSC, the order was not just limited to the federal cases 
pending in the MDL. The judge extended the order to “orthopedic bone screw 
cases that are finally disposed of in state courts, to the extent the parties agree, 
or if ordered by the presiding judge or an authorized judge of that state 
court.”111 In other words, the parties and state court were invited, but not 
required, to follow the order—though the implication indicated an expectation 
that the invitation would be accepted. This type of expectation may be a 
 
 106 Catherine R. Borden & Emery G. Lee III, Beyond Transfer: Coordination of Complex Litigation in 
State and Federal Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 31 REV. LITIG. 997, 1008 (2012) (quoting Conference 
of Chief Justices, Resolution 2: Directing the National Center for State Courts to Promote Communication and 
Best Practices for the Management of Like-Kind Litigation That Spans Multiple State Jurisdictions and 
Federal Districts (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/ 
01262011-Directing-NCSC-Promote-Communication-Litigation-State-Jurisdictions.ashx). 
 107 See, e.g., Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1702–03 (discussing a state court’s decision to “track” the 
federal court’s case management plan in asbestos litigation); id. at 1704–05 (same, in separate asbestos 
litigation); id. at 1743–44 (discussing the risk of federal judges exerting too much influence over state 
colleagues). 
 108 See, e.g., id. at 1744 (“In light of federal courts’ greater resources, this tendency [to control the 
litigation] is understandable, but judges should take care that dominance be avoided if possible.”). 
 109 Borden & Lee, supra note 106, 1019–20 (discussing criticism by Professor McGovern and Judge 
Schwarzer). 
 110 Id. at 1014 (noting that a majority of judges aware of ongoing state proceedings communicated with 
their state counterparties, and of those who communicated, 94% did so directly). 
 111 Pretrial Order No. 402, In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1996 WL 
900349, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1996) (emphasis added). 
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reflection of joint coordination and personal understandings between the 
federal and state judges prior to the issuance of such orders. 
Hearings at which judges jointly preside are another technique to facilitate 
such cooperation.112 This technique is rarely used in practice.113 
The In re Diet Drugs MDL is a key example of open collaboration between 
the federal judge and the state judge overseeing related cases.114 There were 
joint state/federal hearings, followed by the MDL court’s coordination order 
that observed that the California state judge was “expected to approve in 
substantially similar language” the same order.115 The order purported to 
require the defendant “[u]pon approval” of the state court judge, to deduct 6% 
of any amount paid to the plaintiffs, even in the state court cases, and deposit 
that sum into the MDL’s common benefit fund.116 The common benefit fund in 
the In re Diet Drugs case was ultimately controlled by the state judge, rather 
than the federal MDL judge.117 More typically the MDL court assumes control 
of the common benefit fund, but it might allow attorneys litigating state cases 
who have no cases in the MDL to make claims for work benefitting the 
national litigation.118 
At its core, the movement toward cooperative interjurisdictional 
coordination purports to respect the traditional limits on the MDL court’s 
power by asking the state courts to work together with the federal court and, 
ultimately, jointly enforce the MDL pretrial orders. While unobjectionable in 
terms of the formal power of the federal court generally, this kind of 
interjurisdictional judicial coordination nevertheless has sometimes come 
under fire for creating delays and encouraging strategic maneuvering by both 
plaintiffs and defendants.119 
 
 112 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.313 (2004). 
 113 Borden & Lee, supra note 106, at 1021 (discussing a survey of MDL transferee judges finding only 
13% of the respondents held joint hearings). 
 114 See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 467, In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 1999 WL 124414, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1999) [hereinafter In re Diet 
Drugs] (“[T]he court has conferred with the [California state court judge who] . . . . is the state-wide 
coordinating judicial officer duly appointed by the Supreme Court of California to administer the diet drug 
cases filed in California state courts.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.313. 
 115 In re Diet Drugs, 1999 WL 124414, at *1. 
 116 Id. at *4. 
 117 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.312. 
 118 Id. § 20.312 & n.705. 
 119 Id. § 20.31; Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1858 (1997). 
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This coordination may be vulnerable to the interpersonal dealings of the 
various judges in working together.120 The charisma and persuasive ability of 
the federal MDL judge to influence state colleagues may be a decisive factor in 
the success—leaving the success of coordination potentially vulnerable to 
variances in personality and experience.121 It could collapse if either court 
decides to act unilaterally or independently in a way that harms administration 
of the cases in the other court.122 
While few state or federal judges report problems due to interpersonal 
relationships,123 reluctance to cooperate does occur. Indeed, one such instance 
of state refusal to cede control of complex litigation to a federal MDL resulted 
in a dispute that ultimately required resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2011 in Smith v. Bayer Corp.124 The MDL involved thousands of lawsuits over 
the drug Baycol.125 The federal judge “engaged in extensive efforts to 
coordinate its proceedings with state courts handling Baycol cases.”126 Despite 
these efforts, the federal court issued an injunction to force a state court to 
follow the MDL’s lead: when the federal court denied class certification to a 
putative class of West Virginia purchasers of Baycol in the MDL,127 it then 
issued an injunction to bar the state judge in West Virginia from independently 
considering a motion for certification of a similar class under state law in a 
parallel proceeding.128 The Supreme Court unanimously held the Anti-
Injunction Act prevented the federal judge overseeing the MDL from issuing 
such an injunction.129 
Smith demonstrated MDL courts have no formal power to coerce state 
judicial compliance in parallel proceedings.130 Cooperation must be welcomed 
by all jurists overseeing proceedings outside the MDL, or it simply does not 
work. When it works, such cooperation helps parties and judges engage in 
 
 120 But see Borden & Lee, supra note 106, at 1025 (finding that few MDL transferee judges perceived any 
reluctance among state judges to coordinate with the MDL proceeding); id. at 1027 (discussing a survey of 
state judges finding that they did not perceive relationships with federal judges to be problematic). 
 121 See Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1736–37. 
 122 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.311. 
 123 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 124 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 125 In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 201 (D. Minn. 2003).  
 126 In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 2368. 
 127 Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. at 2375, 2382. 
 130 See Borden & Lee, supra note 106, at 998 (discussing the implications of Smith for interjurisdictional 
coordination). 
THOMAS GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/10/2014 1:06 PM 
2014] MORPHING CASE BOUNDARIES 1361 
informal aggregation through coordination,131 navigating through the 
federalism problem to achieve global settlements in mass tort actions—indeed, 
some experienced MDL judges believe that such settlements are impossible 
without coordination.132 
Despite the utility of coordination, the federalism problem persists, even 
with excellent coordination—it merely appears in a different form: multiple 
courts, and multiple judges, maintain control over different pieces of the 
litigation involved in the settlements. This means there is no single authority in 
charge of implementing, interpreting, and enforcing the settlement terms. 
Unless the state courts cede power to the central authority of the federal MDL, 
decision-making is structurally diffuse, leading right back to the federalism 
problem. As long as these separate court systems do not engage in centralized 
decision-making, ceding power to the MDL, the structural problem persists.133 
Parties understandably often want one judge overseeing the entire global 
settlement to offer a single, authoritative voice regarding the settlement 
agreement’s interpretation and implementation. For this reason, federal MDL 
judges face some pressure to facilitate settlement by asserting control over 
such settlements to bring about global peace.134 
Part I.C demonstrates that some MDL courts have increasingly been 
answering this challenge by moving well beyond cooperative coordination. 
MDL courts have begun facilitating global settlements and administering 
common benefit funds in portions of “litigation” filed in state courts, and 
sometimes never filed in any court at all. In some situations, they become the 
global settlement facilitator over state and federal claims in mass tort litigation, 
without regard to the court system in which those claims were brought (or even 
whether claims were brought in court at all). They also become the global 
administrator over payments for common benefit work undertaken in any court 
system, assessing fees against settlements in any forum, and handing out 
money for work performed in any forum. The MDL judges in this context have 
 
 131 Professor Erichson coined the term “informal aggregation” to refer to coordinated efforts that treat “the 
litigation as single, integrated whole,” while still maintaining separate lawsuits with independent claims. See 
Erichson, supra note 1, at 383. 
 132 See Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1714 (discussing cases in which defendants would not have 
settled had they been forced to go to trial in state cases). 
 133 Centralized decision-making has been identified as a line federal and state judges should avoid 
crossing. Borden & Lee, supra note 106, at 1019–20. 
 134 See, e.g., Schwarzer et al., supra note 49, at 1719–20 (observing that as early as 1980, in an MDL 
concerning fire in an MGM Hotel, the federal judge met with state plaintiffs to assess the value of their claims 
and facilitate a global settlement, because that was the only kind of settlement defendants would accept). 
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become universal “settlement facilitators” overseeing transjurisdictional, 
multidimensional “litigation,” transcending the limits of individual lawsuits.135 
In the context of global settlements, the trappings of voluntary cooperation 
appear to sometimes yield in favor of expedience and the need for global 
peace, particularly when those orders involve opt-in settlements in which the 
state parties want the MDL court’s oversight of the settlement. 
C. Trailblazing New Paths to Global Peace Through Transjurisdictional 
Settlement Administration 
An important series of twenty-first century MDLs reflect an emerging 
understanding of the federal courts’ power to influence parties, attorneys, and 
cases pending in state court, using mechanisms of both aggregation and 
disaggregation simultaneously. This new understanding has emerged almost 
exclusively in the context of global settlements (i.e., settlements that dispose 
not only of cases pending in an MDL, but also related, nonremovable cases 
pending around the country in state courts). It has made appearances in 
massive pharmaceutical and medical device products liability cases, involving 
thousands of plaintiffs suing individually in many different courts. 
This new approach puts the MDL court in the role of a global settlement 
administrator, overseeing the resolution of claims filed in any court (state or 
federal), and sometimes even private claims tendered to the defendant without 
ever having been filed in any court. In other words, the federal court takes a 
measure of control over settlement of the mass tort itself, without regard to 
whether the federal court would have had jurisdiction in each individual claim 
subject to the settlement. Individual claimants opt in to the resulting settlement, 
accepting its structure and oversight by the MDL court.136 
This remarkable approach did not emerge fully formed from any single 
case. It has evolved iteratively, using innovations that have been expanded and 
built upon by experienced MDL judges learning from the experiences of 
colleagues. Understanding its current force requires a look back at a series of 
cases that have collectively reconceptualized the function of the MDL court at 
the settlement phase. Taken together, these decisions have implicitly redefined 
 
 135 Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 50–52. 
 136 Such claimants have the choice whether to sign onto the settlement. They may instead decline to settle 
and continue to litigate individually. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3, at 378–79 (“The [MDL settlement] 
agreement is usually an opt-in agreement; when a claimant opts into the agreement, the claimant and the 
claimant’s primary counsel agree to be bound by the terms of the agreement, including the payment of 
common benefit fees.”). 
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the “case” of the MDL—and at the same time created a new space that is at 
once powerfully aggregated and yet formally disaggregated. 
1. In re Zyprexa’s Invention of the “Quasi–Class Action” 
In 2006, District Judge Weinstein famously likened the “many individual 
related cases” within an MDL to a “quasi-class action.”137 He was referring to 
a diffuse collection of individual cases not qualifying for formal class 
treatment under Rule 23, yet still having some of the characteristics and 
classwide litigation.138 He coined the term in relation to a global settlement 
negotiated in a major pharmaceutical products liability MDL in In re Zyprexa 
Products Liability Litigation.139 The concept was the seed of the current 
revolution in MDL courts’ thinking about the scope of their power. Zyprexa 
itself, however, was fairly modest in its use of the MDL court’s settlement 
power. 
In Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein capped legal fees for most settlements at 20% 
and further ordered that PSC common benefit work would be paid out of a 
general global settlement fund.140 Claimants to the fund had to opt in by 
choosing to participate in the settlement. Though the global settlement fund 
paid claims in both state and federal court, the MDL court order limited the 
order’s application to “all settling actions in this multidistrict litigation.”141 
Judge Weinstein was active in coordinating with state court judges to 
encourage them to follow his lead, but the order itself imposed no obligation 
on parties outside of the MDL. He instead sent a letter to state court judges 
“suggesting coordination and cooperation.”142 Despite the “quasi–class action” 
moniker, Zyprexa stayed well within the traditional boundaries of the federal 
courts and the conventional understanding of MDL as a mere procedural 
wrapper around individual suits that had been filed in federal court. The global 
settlement likely worked because it was attractive to individual plaintiffs who 
might otherwise bear the risk, delay, and cost of continuing to litigate alone. 
 
 137 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 138 See id. at 491 (“While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private agreement 
between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has many of the characteristics of a class action and may be 
properly characterized as a quasi-class action subject to general equitable powers of the court.”). 
 139 Id. at 490–91. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. at 496 (emphasis added).  
 142 Id. at 491.  
THOMAS GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/10/2014 1:06 PM 
1364 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1339 
The emergence of the quasi–class action analogy in MDL was thus a 
modest innovation in its original context. Although likening the role of the 
MDL court in settlement to the role of a court overseeing a certified class, the 
quasi–class action analogy was merely descriptive, rather than a justification to 
move off of the well-trodden path of cooperative coordination to solve the 
federalism problem using the aggregative toolbox of Rule 23.143 This quickly 
changed in subsequent cases. 
2. In re Guidant’s Extension of MDL Power over State Court Settlements 
An unpublished order in 2008 in the In re Guidant Corp. Implantable 
Defibrillators Products Liability Litigation broke new ground with the quasi–
class action analogy.144 Relying on Zyprexa’s definition of the MDL as a 
quasi–class action for settlement purposes,145 the court considered a complex 
settlement agreement in this products liability case, with a total settlement 
value of $240 million. 
The case involved 8,550 plaintiffs who brought individual actions for 
injuries allegedly caused by defective defibrillators and pacemakers.146 The 
settlement agreement specified that the MDL court would decide the amount of 
common benefit payments to counsel who had engaged in work resulting in a 
common benefit.147 The court understood the settlement covered not only 
claims in the MDL, but also state cases, and even claims that had not yet been 
filed in any court.148 
The MDL court ordered that $10 million of the $240 million global 
settlement was to be set aside for common costs.149 Additionally, over the 
objection of state court plaintiffs,150 the MDL court ordered that $34.5 million 
be set aside for common-benefit attorneys’ fees.151 The net result was that a 
portion of the settlement money from the state cases and unfiled, privately 
 
 143 The analogy received the stamp of approval in a concurrence in a Second Circuit opinion. See In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 129–30 (2d. Cir. 2010) (Kaplan, J. concurring). Judge Kaplan 
agreed with Judge Weinstein about the “substantial similarities” between MDLs and class actions, and the 
need for common benefit funds of the type utilized by Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa settlement. See id.  
 144 MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. March 7, 2008). 
 145 Id. at *6.  
 146 Id. at *1, *10. 
 147 Id. at *4. 
 148 See id. at *3. 
 149 Id. at *4. 
 150 Id. at *11. 
 151 Id. at *16. 
THOMAS GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/10/2014 1:06 PM 
2014] MORPHING CASE BOUNDARIES 1365 
presented claims flowed into the federal MDL common benefit fund upon 
settlement. The court went so far as to find that the state plaintiffs benefitted 
from the work of the attorneys in the MDL in negotiating the settlement, even 
in “state court cases where a significant amount of work was done on behalf of 
individual Plaintiffs with little to no sharing of work product from the MDL 
attorneys.”152 
The court ultimately ordered state court plaintiffs, and even claimants who 
had never filed a case in any court, to give up about 15% of their individual 
settlements to the common benefit fund in the MDL for distribution to the 
MDL’s PSC. The state court plaintiffs and other claimants had to choose either 
to participate in the global settlement (and pay into the MDL common benefit 
fund) or walk away from the settlement, and proceed alone.153 In other words, 
by choosing to participate in the settlement, these state court plaintiffs were 
contractually agreeing to the authority of the federal court to redistribute part 
of their settlement for common benefit work. They were thus effectively opting 
into a partially aggregative device in the same moment they were exercising 
their right to settle their individual lawsuit. 
Relying on Judge Weinstein’s order in Zyprexa, the MDL court in Guidant 
pushed the quasi–class action analogy much further than Judge Weinstein had. 
Like Zyprexa, Guidant presumptively capped attorney contingency fees in all 
cases that were part of the settlement; however, the cap applied whether the 
settled cases were filed in state or federal court.154 The individual retainer 
agreements between attorneys and their clients in the individual cases in both 
state and federal court were generally nullified by this order.155 The PSC’s 
work on behalf of the litigation trumped those individual retainer agreements. 
Guidant is a path-making decision in its expansion of the MDL court’s 
power to encompass not only the federal litigants, but also anyone with a claim 
to be settled. The opt-in settlement agreement defined the scope of the MDL 
court’s power, under this approach. This solution was pragmatic in that it 
revealed a way to achieve global settlements and avoid the federalism problem 
through a settlement agreement. The MDL court emerged as a 
transjurisdictional global settlement administrator, overseeing both the global 
 
 152 Id. at *13. 
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. at *18–19 (capping attorneys’ fees at 20%). 
 155 See id. at *19. 
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settlement and common benefit fund, with power over all the settling parties, 
including those who were never part of the MDL. 
3. Pushing the Boundaries of the Quasi–Class Action to New Frontiers in 
the In re Vioxx Global Settlement Agreement 
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation followed Guidant’s lead, blending 
the unilateral assertion of settlement authority in an MDL where there had also 
been state–federal coordination.156 It also expanded the concept and offered a 
defense of the new reconceptualization of federal judicial power in MDLs. The 
global settlement agreement was again the crux of the exercise of this power. 
The Vioxx settlement agreement was reached between the defendant Merck 
and a Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Committee (NPC) of attorneys for claims that the 
pharmaceutical drug caused strokes and heart attacks—in other words, it was 
not a settlement between any particular plaintiff (or even group of plaintiffs) 
and the defendant to settle any plaintiff’s specific claims, but rather an 
agreement among a select group of plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle the 
litigation.157 
It was a novel settlement agreement in the way it ensured that nearly all the 
plaintiffs who had claims (whether in the MDL or not) would choose to 
participate in the global settlement. It obligated plaintiffs’ attorneys to certify 
that all clients they represented had opted into the settlement; any plaintiffs 
who rejected the settlement would have to find other counsel to represent 
them.158 The plaintiffs thus retained the individual ability to accept or reject 
this settlement agreement, based on the autonomy of their separately filed 
 
 156 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (Vioxx I), 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008); Vioxx III, 802 F. 
Supp. 2d 740, 760 (E.D. La. 2011) (discussing a meeting between MDL judge, and judges from Texas, New 
Jersey, and California in New Orleans with representatives from Merck and the PSC); Transcript of Status 
Conference Before the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon, United States District Judge at 22–23, Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 
2d 606 (MDL No. 1657-L), available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Transcripts/01182008trans.pdf 
(discussing the federal judge’s conversations with state judges in New Jersey and California concerning 
settlement administration). 
 157 The NPC included “all counsel appointed to the Executive Committee of the Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee” in the MDL, and also representatives of coordinated state proceedings in New Jersey, California, 
and Texas. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature 
Pages Hereto 1 (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement Agreement], available at http://www. 
officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf; see also 
Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. at 609 (announcing the settlement agreement between NPC and Merck); Adam Liptak, In 
Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer’s Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, A12. 
 158 See Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 157, at 2; see also Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 218 
(discussing the Vioxx settlement terms). 
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actions. At the same time, their attorneys acted in concert to exert pressure to 
ensure maximum participation by the individual plaintiffs. Aggregative 
mechanisms to control the plaintiffs’ attorneys thus contrasted with the 
disaggregative autonomy of the individual plaintiffs. 
While the novel mechanism for achieving maximum plaintiff opt-ins has 
received significant scholarly attention,159 the innovative role of the MDL 
court in overseeing settlement with nonfederal claimants has been largely 
overlooked by commentators. The global settlement agreement purported to 
resolve claims filed in state and federal courts,160 which at that time included 
26,000 active lawsuits, with 47,000 plaintiffs, and another 14,500 claimants 
who had sought compensation from Merck without filing suit.161 The 
agreement appointed District Judge Fallon, the federal MDL judge, to preside 
over the global settlement (i.e., of both state and federal claims).162 Crucially, 
the settlement agreement obligated each settling party to agree to the authority 
of District Judge Fallon to act in this capacity.163 It went so far as to purport 
that this federal judge would “sit as a binding arbitration panel and whose 
decision shall be final, binding and Non-Appealable.”164 
Despite the attempt to hang the trappings of private dispute resolution on 
the court’s oversight of the MDL, the settlement agreement invoked the full 
power of the federal court.165 The agreement authorized District Judge Fallon 
to create and administer a common benefit fund, created from a levy of 8% of 
the recovered amounts from every claimant who settled under the 
agreement.166 The agreement provided that he would consult with (but not 
necessarily defer to) the state court judges who had presided over the cases not 
in the MDL.167 His subsequent enforcement of the agreement made clear that 
he was acting in his capacity as a U.S. District Judge, exercising the power of a 
 
 159 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 218 (discussing the innovative Vioxx settlement mechanism). 
 160 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 157, at 1. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (“The Settlement Agreement expressly contemplates that this Court 
shall oversee various aspects of the administration of settlement proceedings . . . .”); see also Vioxx Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 157, § 6.1.1, at 29; Amendment to Settlement Agreement § 1.2.10 (Jan. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Amendments%20to%20Master%20 
Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.  
 163 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 157, §§ 8.1.1–.2, at 33. 
 164 Id. § 8.1.2., at 33. 
 165 See, e.g., id. § 10.1.2, at 37 (“The submission of fraudulent Claims will violate the criminal laws of the 
United States, and subject those responsible to criminal prosecution in the federal courts.”). 
 166 Id. § 9.2.1, at 35.  
 167 Id. § 9.2.3, at 36. 
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court, not the power of a private arbitration forum, by invoking the court’s 
“equitable authority.”168 
In this role as transjurisdictional claims administrator, the Vioxx MDL court 
oversaw a $4.85 billion settlement fund.169 As in Guidant and Zyprexa, the 
court asserted power to limit attorneys’ fees owed by settling plaintiffs by 
relying on the emerging quasi–class action analogy.170 District Judge Fallon 
understood the settlement agreement itself to contemplate this power.171 
To his credit, District Judge Fallon recognized that the need for global 
peace in mass tort litigation pending simultaneously in state and federal courts 
would make settlements like this one increasingly common,172 and he thus 
carefully explained the sources of authority he invoked. He pointed to three 
different sources of authority to support the decision to override the fee 
agreements of all settling plaintiffs, including those who were not part of the 
MDL: (1) the contractual terms of the settlement itself,173 (2) the court’s 
equitable authority over the administration of the global settlement,174 and 
(3) the court’s inherent authority to exercise ethical supervision over the 
parties.175 The discussion of each of these sources of power, however, 
implicitly assumed that this power extended automatically to all parties to the 
settlement. This implicit assumption reflects a fundamental shift in the nature 
of MDL. 
Some of the settling parties never had cases in the MDL because their state 
court cases were not removable, or they had made private claims to Merck 
without ever filing a lawsuit in any forum.176 This means the only possible 
 
 168 See Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612 (E.D. La. 2008) (discussing “this Court’s equitable authority 
over the global settlement” as well as its “supervisory authority” over attorneys’ fees). 
 169 Id. at 609. 
 170 Id. at 612 (“[T]he Court finds that the Vioxx global settlement may properly be analyzed as occurring 
in a quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for 
reasonableness.”). 
 171 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 378 (discussing section 9.2 of the settlement agreement). 
 172 Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
 173 Id. at 614 (“The Settlement Agreement expressly grants this Court the authority to oversee various 
aspects of the global settlement administration.”). 
 174 Id. at 611–12 (invoking the quasi–class action analogy). 
 175 Id. at 612; see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (Vioxx II), 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553–54 (E.D. La. 
2009) (reconsidering and reaffirming the sources of authority discussed in Vioxx I). 
 176 See generally Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 611–14. The scope of the MDL court’s order crystallizes 
when it is read in conjunction with the settlement agreement, which unambiguously included state and federal 
claims, as well as private claims tendered directly to the defendant, and its appointment of Judge Fallon to 
preside over the entire settlement. See discussion supra notes 160–61 (observing the settlement agreement’s 
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source of authority over them would have been their choice to opt into the 
settlement agreement itself. In this sense, the settlement became the federal 
controversy over which the MDL court was now presiding. 
The Vioxx court ultimately capped fees for all claimants enrolled in the 
global settlement at 32%, without regard to whether those claims had ever been 
part of the MDL.177 This nullified the retainer agreements of attorneys whose 
clients had agreed to higher contingent fees.178 From this 32% cap, additional 
sums for common benefit work would eventually be deducted.179 Later, the 
court fixed the value of the common benefit work at over $315 million (6.5% 
of the $4.85 billion settlement).180 
Within 31 months, over $4.35 billion was distributed to 32,886 claimants, 
resulting in an “efficiency [that was] unprecedented in mass tort settlements of 
this size.”181 Although District Judge Fallon credited the attorneys on both 
sides, the plan and lien administrators, the pro se curator, and the special 
masters for the efficiency,182 the efficiency unquestionably also flowed directly 
from the innovative control over the global settlement exercised by the federal 
district judge, which allowed one voice to provide clear guidance on difficult 
questions regarding the settlement agreement’s interpretation and application. 
Over 32,000 separate claims were resolved by an aggregative settlement 
agreement that emphasized the disaggregated nature of the claims being 
settled. A hybrid had fully emerged—a third path in between disaggregated 
individual litigation and full aggregation under Rule 23. 
Vioxx illustrates the possible benefits to parties when the federalism 
problem with regard to disaggregated litigation ceases to plague the dispute: 
defendants get global peace, plaintiffs obtain compensation for the harm they 
suffered, lawyers are rewarded for their work bringing the case to closure, and 
it all happens rather quickly in a public forum. These benefits arguably derived 
from the aggregate qualities of this settlement procedure in the MDL, qualities 
created through ad hoc mechanisms that are unbounded by Rule 23. 
 
inclusion of 14,500 private claimants who never filed suit and its resolution of claims filed in state and federal 
court); discussion supra note 162 (discussing the settlement agreement’s appointment of the MDL judge to 
preside over the global settlement); discussion supra note 163 (discussing the settlement agreement’s 
requirement that parties agree to the authority of the MDL judge to preside over the settlement).  
 177 Vioxx I, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 617. 
 178 See id. (acknowledging that 33%–40% was a standard contingent fee). 
 179 Id. at 617–18.  
 180 Vioxx III, 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 758 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 181 Id. at 762. 
 182 Id. 
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This efficiency was not without its detractors in the litigation. A small 
group of attorneys challenged the MDL court’s authority to enforce the fee 
cap.183 Their argument emphasized the sua sponte quality of the order, where 
no claimant had challenged the reasonableness of the fees.184 These attorneys 
claimed there was no “Article III ‘case’ or ‘controversy’” and thus no subject 
matter jurisdiction over the issue.185 Judge Fallon rejected the argument 
because the parties themselves invoked the power of the district court to 
preside over the settlement agreement when they opted into it, and he relied on 
Guidant and Zyprexa to justify the power of an MDL court to cap contingent 
fees even in the absence of a challenge to the reasonableness of those fees by 
claimants.186 
The Vioxx settlement has been criticized on multiple grounds by scholars. 
For example, Professors Baker and Silver have argued that it interfered with 
the contractual relationship between attorneys and their clients.187 Professors 
Silver and Miller have critiqued the quasi–class action concept.188 Professor 
Issacharoff, however, has observed that whatever the force of these criticisms, 
the settlement was effective in helping plaintiffs to recover compensation and 
received an “overwhelmingly positive response” from the plaintiffs 
themselves.189 He also lauds the manner that it used a “private arrangement to 
overcome the disfunctionality of the formal procedural system.”190 
Professor Issacharoff’s observation suggests that the Vioxx settlement 
agreement may be a public model that parallels defendant-created, postdispute, 
private claims resolution vehicles—with the important difference that this one 
was designed collaboratively by the court, the PSC, and the defendant and has 
 
 183 Vioxx II, 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (E.D. La. 2009). 
 184 Id. at 556. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 557–58.  
 187 See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1833, 1847–48 (2011). Professors Erichson and Zipursky have also argued that the enforcement of the 
settlement itself “pushed the envelope in legal ethics” by obligating plaintiffs’ attorneys to recommend it to 
clients. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 267 
(2011). 
 188 Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District 
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109–11 (2010). Attorney Jeremy Grabill, a 
former law clerk to Judge Fallon, has added to the chorus critiquing the application of the “quasi–class action” 
idea in the Vioxx MDL, arguing it “added to the confusion that now exists concerning the proper role for courts 
to play.” Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 
123, 178 (2012).  
 189 Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 219. 
 190 Id. 
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some highly aggregative characteristics.191 The Vioxx agreement also 
effectively solved concerns about fractional participation through controversial 
attorney “arm-twisting,” threatening to freeze out plaintiff-side attorneys who 
failed to get all their clients to participate in the settlement.192 
Although Judge Fallon did not discuss the definition of the “case” before 
the MDL court with respect to the state court plaintiffs, or the claimants who 
never sued anywhere, the Vioxx decision reflects an implicit new 
understanding of the scope of the controversy over which the MDL court had 
authority: the authority in the settlement phase encompassed the entire mass 
tort dispute, extending to all claimants opting into a global settlement 
administered by the MDL court, regardless of where their individual lawsuits 
or claims originated (and enormous pressure may be brought to bear on 
attorneys to ensure all their clients opt in to maximize the number of claimants 
under the MDL court’s power). 
This understanding stands in stark contrast to the narrower understanding 
of the MDL court’s power in earlier cases. MDL is no longer merely a 
procedural wrapper around a collection of individual lawsuits filed in or 
removed to federal court. The twenty-first century MDL court’s power 
becomes transjurisdictional by asserting control over a global settlement fund 
created by a private mass settlement agreement. The boundary of the MDL 
court’s power became defined by the mass settlement, not just the individual 
claims that had once comprised the MDL, and yet it still purported to preserve 
the autonomy of those individual claimants by requiring the claimant’s 
signature on the settlement agreement to trigger the global power. 
Despite the aggregative qualities of the settlement, the Vioxx litigation also 
reflects the disaggregative potential of MDL. The MDL court conducted six 
individual bellwether trials—trials of separate cases, each decided by a 
different jury.193 The defendants won all but one of them in federal court.194 
The one federal victory for the plaintiff then resulted in a settlement with that 
plaintiff while it was on appeal.195 Additionally, approximately thirteen related 
cases were tried in state court in six different states around the same time 
 
 191 See Dodge, supra note 4, at 1275–79 (describing postdispute disaggregative mechanisms); id. at 1306–
07 (analyzing the dysfunctional features of defendant-designed claims resolution facilities).  
 192 See id. at 1310 (discussing problems of fractional enforcement). 
 193 Fallon et al., supra note 58, at 2335. 
 194 Id.  
 195 Id. at 2336. 
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period.196 While these were individual trials that had no binding effect on the 
rest of the claims in the MDL, the results nevertheless spurred resolution for 
everyone else who ultimately participated in the global settlement.197 Despite 
the defendant’s success in trying the cases, Merck nevertheless then entered 
global settlement negotiations and agreed to fund a $4.85 billion global claims 
settlement facility.198 
4. Expanding MDL Power in the Deepwater Horizon Litigation in the 
Absence of a Global Settlement Agreement 
The Vioxx innovations regarding the scope of the MDL court’s power 
found immediate application in the Deepwater Horizon litigation, based on the 
largest oil spill in U.S. history.199 As in other MDLs, District Judge Barbier set 
out to establish a common benefit fund by assessing 4%–6% of the gross 
amount of all individual settlements, to be paid into a fund to compensate 
attorneys engaged in common benefit work.200 He initially ordered that the 
assessment applied not only to cases in the MDL that settled, but also some 
state court cases, and even claims paid through the GCCF,201 a unique, 
nonjudicial, private forum for compensation of claims, established by BP after 
the Gulf oil spill disaster.202 
After strenuous objections from claimants who never filed any lawsuits and 
instead were paid only through the private GCCF, the court eventually 
modified this order and exempted GCCF claimants from the assessment.203 
The order offered no reason for the modification exempting GCCF settlements. 
The assessment remained in effect, however, against state court plaintiffs 
represented by counsel who participated in the MDL or had access to MDL 
discovery.204 
 
 196 Id. at 2335. 
 197 See id. at 2338 (“[B]ellwether trials can precipitate and inform settlement negotiations by indicating 
future trends, that is, by providing guidance on how similar claims may fare before subsequent juries.”). 
 198 See id. at 2337. 
 199 See Oil Spill I, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 6817982, at *1, *2 n.1 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011); Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of Pure Economic Loss: Reflections on the 
Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 105 (2011) (discussing the magnitude of the spill). 
 200 Oil Spill I, 2011 WL 6817982, at *1. 
 201 Id. at *6 (applying the order to state cases where plaintiffs were represented by attorneys who also had 
cases in the MDL and had access to MDL work product); see also Dodge, supra note 4, at 1255–56 
(discussing the GCCF).  
 202 See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 8, at 398, 400. 
 203 See Oil Spill II, MDL No. 2179, 2012 WL 161194, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 204 Id. 
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Unlike Vioxx, in the Deepwater Horizon litigation, none of the state court 
parties opted in to any global settlement giving the court supervisory authority 
over fee allocations. These parties filed suits in state courts, litigated entirely in 
state courts, and settled in state courts. Or they participated in a private dispute 
resolution proceeding. They were never part of the MDL. Nevertheless, they 
found themselves bound by a federal court order instructing the defendant not 
to pay them the full amount of their settlement agreements they had executed 
because 4%–6% of their gross settlement was owed to the federal court for the 
common benefit work by the MDL’s PSC that purportedly was useful to 
settling plaintiffs outside the MDL, without regard to whether those plaintiffs 
made individual use of that work. 
The series of cases from Guidant through the Deepwater Horizon litigation 
shows a pronounced evolution in the approach of these MDL courts to global 
settlements. Each new case builds on and expands upon the power of the MDL 
court over parties outside the MDL. These courts’ understanding of the 
controversy over which they have power now encompasses parties outside the 
MDL, at least in the context of global settlements and common benefit 
funds⎯and, as the Deepwater Horizon litigation shows, may now even be 
creeping toward claimants who never consented to the MDL court’s power 
over their individual settlements. In this way, the new breed of MDL is highly 
aggregative (sweeping masses of claims into a global settlement, even claims 
not pending in the MDL itself), and yet highly disaggregative (effecting 
individual settlements on a massive scale). 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE FEDERALISM PROBLEM IN MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION 
Given the demise of mass tort class actions, Professor Burch has aptly 
called MDLs “the new mass-tort frontier.”205 The shape of that frontier appears 
to be changing rapidly. 
Part I demonstrated that a new form of transjurisdictional, aggregated, 
global settlement of mass torts is emerging in MDL, despite the demise of 
Rule 23 class actions. Each iteration of MDL innovation has yielded a 
subsequent expansion by a later court: the quasi–class action concept initially 
relied on coordinated orders from state courts to enforce the MDL court’s 
decisions; then MDL courts independently asserted power over state litigants, 
 
 205 Burch, supra note 101, at 88. 
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but only when they opted into a global settlement; finally, federal power was 
exercised over claimants who never had a case before the federal court, and 
who had not even opted into a global settlement. The modern MDL judicial 
culture is admirably efficient and yet also self-perpetuating. These cases cite 
each other, relying on the groundwork laid by each prior application of the 
quasi–class action analogy to extend it to new frontiers. 
This Part argues that the emerging transjurisdictional MDL settlement trend 
has not solved the federalism problem⎯it has merely submerged it. Part II.A 
demonstrates that, despite the pressure to aggregate, a small but growing 
number of MDL judges are declining to exercise mass settlement power over 
claims not in the MDL because of the persistence of the federalism problem. 
Part II.B argues that the new conception of transjurisdictional settlement 
authority in MDL ultimately succeeds in forging global peace only because of 
state court acquiescence. The exercise of transjurisdictional settlement 
authority thus is grounded in a view of federal power that has functioned 
successfully only because of a high level of deference by other cooperating 
courts, attorneys, and parties. The authority has no intrinsic structural 
foundation in the MDL device itself. 
A. The Narrow Conception of MDL Power: Locating the Federalism Problem 
in MDL’s Narrow Statutory Definition 
Despite the utility of this evolution of MDL power in administering global 
settlements, there has been a persistent stream of resistance. A number of MDL 
courts have refused to issue orders binding parties not in the MDL. The 
resistance stems from the persistence of the federalism problem. 
Some MDL courts have refused to follow the expansive quasi–class action, 
transjurisdictional, aggregate settlement model. They have persisted in 
applying the older, narrow understanding of the MDL court’s power over 
parties. These courts adhere to the view of the Fourth Circuit in Showa 
Denko.206 Under this alternative model, the MDL courts have declined to seize 
control of the settlement of cases not in the MDL (i.e., cases pending in other 
court systems or involving parties making nonjudicial claims).207 
 
 206 In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Products Liability Litigation–II, 953 F.2d 162, 165–67 (4th 
Cir. 1992). 
 207 See, e.g., In re Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., Emp’t Practices Litig., No. MDL-1700, Cause No. 
3:05-MD-527-RM, 2011 WL 611883, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2011) (finding the court lacked jurisdiction to 
order a hold-back in cases never part of the MDL); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811 
CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010) (finding the court lacked jurisdiction to order hold-
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This alternative, disaggregated model of MDL views coordination with 
state courts as the only possible solution to the federalism problem. Indeed, 
these cases tend to suggest rather hopefully that state judges handling the state 
cases may order participation in the MDL’s common benefit fund, where those 
state plaintiffs received a substantial benefit from that work.208 They avoid, 
however, taking control of an amorphous “litigation” in its entirety, or even of 
a global settlement fund, based on the understanding that they lack jurisdiction 
over parties and issues not in the MDL. 
A split among MDL judges has thus emerged. Other than the admittedly 
dated Hartland/Showa Denko line of authority, the split has generally not been 
reflected in appellate decisions, as it is a product of settlements that evade 
appellate review. The split is important, however, because it goes to the 
fundamental scope of the MDL court’s power to aggregate related claims for 
settlement purposes. 
Reconceptualizing the “litigation” to encompass a global settlement 
involving thousands of claimants who sued in state and federal courts all over 
the country is a marked departure from the traditional understanding of MDL 
as a procedural vessel into which the JPML pours individual cases (and class 
actions), each with its own separate identity as a litigation unit. The traditional 
understanding still has a strong following among federal judges—for good 
reason. 
The MDL statute itself lends support to the traditional understanding. The 
statute contemplates the transfer of civil actions (i.e., lawsuits already filed) 
into the MDL, and the eventual remand of such actions back to their home 
districts.209 Under the statute’s language, the MDL court’s power over the 
dispute encompasses only the right to exercise “coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings” over the civil actions transferred into the MDL.210 
Nonremovable cases filed in any state court and claims brought privately do 
 
backs in state court cases, even though plaintiffs in state court cases had derived substantial benefit from the 
MDL’s common benefit work); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., No. MDL 1431MJD/JGL, 2004 WL 1058105, at 
*3–4 (D. Minn. May 3, 2004) (declining to assess a hold-back against settlements by parties not participating 
in the MDL, and finding the court lacked both original and supplemental jurisdiction over such parties); In re 
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 644, 663–64 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding the court lacked jurisdiction 
to assess a hold-back in state court cases never removed to federal court or transferred to the MDL, but 
enforcing its hold-back order against state court cases that had been remanded after improper removal to 
federal court in the MDL). 
 208 In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL 716190, at *1, *4–5. 
 209 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 210 Id. 
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not fall within § 1407’s language. The existence of a privately negotiated 
global settlement does not alter that limited grant of statutory authority. 
The exercise of transjurisdictional settlement authority cannot be traced to 
Congress’s grant of authority to federal judges overseeing consolidated MDL 
proceedings. In the case of opt-in global settlements, the transjurisdictional 
settlement practice often seems to envision the parties to the settlement as 
creating private authority for aggregated resolution, by opting into the terms of 
the settlement appointing the federal MDL judge as settlement administrator. 
Part II.B demonstrates that this private authority does not resolve the 
federalism problem inherent in nonclass aggregated settlements. 
B. The Broad Conception of MDL Power: Locating the Federalism Problem 
Lurking in Mass Settlements 
Part II.A showed that, though MDL is sometimes classified as a kind of 
formal aggregation,211 the MDL statute created MDL as a mere procedural 
vessel into which the JPML transfers individual lawsuits for consolidated 
pretrial proceedings. The new breed of MDL challenges this understanding by 
conceiving the MDL court’s power to extend to the entire litigation, at least at 
the settlement phase. Part II.B argues that the emergence of transjurisdictional 
MDL settlement does not solve the federalism problem inherent in federal 
complex litigation. It merely submerges it through private agreements. 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that mass settlements of some sort 
have nearly always been a defining feature of MDL. Mass tort disputes that 
survive dismissal march inexorably toward settlement—nearly always on a 
collective basis.212 This flows as much from the parties as the courts.213 
In multijurisdictional mass tort litigation, MDL courts must find a path to 
aggregate settlement, dispose of the dispute piecemeal, or confront the need for 
 
 211 See e.g., Dodge, supra note 4, at 1256. 
 212 Fallon et al., supra note 58, at 2340 (“As in traditional tort litigation, the endgame for a mass tort 
dispute is not trial but settlement . . . . [and] the most ambitious settlements seek to make and enforce a grand, 
all-encompassing peace in the subject area of the litigation as a whole.” (alterations in original) (quoting 
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT, at ix (2007)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 213 “The business of mass litigation dictates a collective approach,” according to Professor Erichson, who 
observes that plaintiffs’ attorneys often seek collective resolution because they represent large inventories of 
claims and plaintiffs, whereas defendants desire inclusive resolution. Erichson, supra note 54, at 1773–75. 
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remanding thousands (or tens of thousands) of cases for individual trials.214 
The exercise of broad settlement authority is arguably a matter of self-
preservation for the federal court system: if meritorious claims do not settle, 
the system lacks the capacity to try all of the federally filed claims 
individually. Settlement is thus the goal.215 The only question is whether the 
settlement will occur piecemeal or in some collective form. In contrast to the 
trend of defendant preferences for disaggregated settlements in private sector 
alternative dispute resolution forums and claim facilities,216 public litigation 
often reflects a strong defendant preference for collective settlements.217 
In the post–class action era of mass torts, MDL courts are struggling to find 
a path to global peace without the benefit of Rule 23.218 Unlike Rule 23 mass 
settlements that bind all class members not opting out, MDL mass settlements 
aggregate by seeking the parties’ express agreement: persons with claims sign 
onto the settlement agreement. In the emerging transjurisdictional type of 
MDL settlement, individuals may participate in the settlement regardless of 
whether they brought a case in the MDL. Their decision to participate in the 
mass settlement overseen by the MDL court becomes a substitute for class 
certification. The settlement agreement thereby uses the claimants’ consent as 
a method of accomplishing a result akin to what nationwide class action 
settlements once did, through the parties’ own choice. While there are no 
absent class members, there may be tens of thousands of claimants who opt in 
and seek compensation from the MDL claims facility, hundreds of lawyers 
seeking payment for common benefit work by applying to the MDL court, and 
a complex settlement administration infrastructure supervised by the MDL 
court—all reminiscent of class settlements. 
Despite the similarities, the formal procedures that enable the collective 
melding of the litigation unit under Rule 23 are missing in MDL. The MDL 
statute itself lacks mechanisms to ensure cohesiveness and the procedural 
ordering that defines the class action. The lack of cohesiveness in the MDL 
creates an inherent instability to any attempted conceptual unity of the 
litigation unit. The separate controversies continue to have separate identities, 
 
 214 Grabill, supra note 188, at 126 (“[C]ourts have struggled in applying established principles concerning 
the scope of judicial authority to evaluate and oversee the implementation of traditional settlements in the 
unfamiliar context of private mass tort settlements.”). 
 215 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Dodge, supra note 4, at 1255–56 
 217 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 218 Grabill, supra note 188, at 126. 
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though these identities are temporarily suppressed by the aggregative device 
during pretrial proceedings. The MDL judges invoking the quasi–class action 
concept for settlement purposes are nevertheless correctly observing MDLs 
behaving like class actions at the settlement stage. The much heralded death of 
aggregation in Rule 23 thus merely relocated the aggregative pressure from the 
certification stage to the settlement stage in federal litigation. 
The utility, efficiency, and effectiveness of the new transjurisdictional 
MDL settlement mechanisms manifest in the scale of the settlements the MDL 
courts achieve and oversee—billions of dollars, and tens of thousands of 
plaintiffs’ claims settled, often in a single “litigation.” Instead of solving the 
federalism problem, these innovations merely shift attention from it, while 
leaving the problem lurking just out of sight: these mass settlements avoid the 
federalism problem only because the participating parties, the MDL court, and 
the state courts with parallel proceedings affected by these settlements 
privately agree not to notice the federalism problem. In other words, they 
jointly agree to disregard the federalism problem in order to settle the dispute. 
Setting aside concerns about subject matter jurisdiction over settling parties 
who have nonremovable claims that could not have been brought in federal 
court, or that were never filed in any court (which are beyond the scope of this 
Response), the system requires complicity by all of the actors in it: federal and 
state court judges, settling plaintiffs and defendants, and counsel for both sides. 
Without such complicity, global settlements cannot function. In the absence of 
congressional authority to exert transjurisdictional authority beyond the federal 
cases transferred to the MDL, the MDL court’s transjurisdictional power only 
exists by the agreement of all who are affected. As long as all participants 
march ahead toward a resolution, there is no one to challenge the MDL court’s 
exercise of power over non-MDL parties—these non-MDL parties themselves 
want to participate in the settlement. 
The difficulty and expense of negotiating a mass settlement likely means 
that once one exists, it may exert a powerful gravitational force over parties, 
attorneys, and judges, pulling them all inexorably toward aggregate resolution. 
However, imagine for a moment that any one of these constituencies were to 
balk at the MDL court’s administration of any aspect of the settlement and 
claims facility. Were a state court litigant to contest the settlement agreement’s 
implementation and convince the state judge with jurisdiction over that case to 
order a result different than the one ordered by the MDL judge, the charade 
would be over. Smith v. Bayer Corp. makes clear that MDL courts cannot 
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enjoin parallel proceedings in state court in complex litigation.219 The MDL 
court thus likely could not prevent state interference with the settlement 
administration, at least as to parties who filed in state court. 
This risk can be illustrated by a counterfactual example from the Vioxx 
case. If a state judge with power over cases participating in the Vioxx litigation 
had disagreed with the MDL order capping attorneys’ fees in all the settled 
cases, and if that state court had instead ordered state plaintiffs to honor their 
retainer agreements by paying the full amount of fees promised upon 
settlement, conflicting orders would have resulted. Plaintiffs and their 
attorneys would be under conflicting obligations with regard to the same 
settlement. The unified nature of the settlement oversight would then collapse. 
The MDL transjurisdictional settlement agreements succeed when state 
judges allow the MDL court to take the reins of the litigation and the global 
settlement, at the parties’ request. This is a form of judge-shopping, though the 
courts do not identify it as such. Settlement oversight requires significant time 
and court resources likely to be lacking in state courts—as well as familiarity 
with the case, parties, attorneys, and issues.220 Moreover, experienced MDL 
judges who developed collaborative relationships with state court judges 
during earlier stages of litigation prior to the settlement (as was the case in the 
Vioxx litigation) are unlikely to suffer state judicial rebellions in the settlement 
phase—the state judges are likely to be well aware how difficult and time-
consuming the mass settlement was to accomplish and have no incentive to 
sink it.221 Injured parties, after all, benefit from efficient compensation. 
Despite the MDL courts’ broad assertion of power, transjurisdictional 
settlements in MDL are a very fragile form of aggregation. They ultimately 
still rely on state court acquiescence, despite the MDL courts’ overt 
appearance of aggressively asserting federal power. It works only because the 
state court judges let it work—and the incentives align to minimize the 
likelihood of nonacquiescence. 
The federalism problem thus persists in MDL at the settlement phase, 
lurking beneath the surface of these mass settlements. The settlements function 
 
 219 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375–76 (2011). 
 220 See Fallon et al., supra note 58, at 2340–41 (explaining the role of the MDL court in presiding over 
global settlement negotiations by virtue of the “centralized forum”). 
 221 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reexamining the Arguments in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2009) (“What are we going to do with these cases in the absence of efficiency and in the 
absence of political will on the part of the other branches of government? What’s the reality of the situation?”). 
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through an implicit delegation of power—a silent judicial agreement to let the 
settling parties choose the federal MDL court to oversee the enormously 
complex details of the claims facility. This sort of radical “super-aggregation” 
thus turns out to be not so different at its core from the traditional judicial 
coordination. The transjurisdictional settlement oversight, in this way, derives 
authority from the implicit assent of the state courts that defer to the federal 
court in the settlement administration, as well as the parties opting into the 
settlement. These MDL courts appear to assert global settlement power 
because no one else wants it, and the parties feel someone needs to have it to 
effectuate settlement. 
In a sense, transjurisdictional global settlements are a uniquely postmodern 
feature of mass tort litigation. They settle claims in all jurisdictions at once 
without all of the settling cases being fully under the power of any one 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. They exist in a liminal space that is neither a class 
action nor an individual action, administering settlements without actually 
having statutory power over all the parties, using consent as a proxy for formal 
procedural devices, and tacit state judicial deference as an alternative to 
congressional authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Over two decades ago, Judith Resnik aptly observed that in complex 
litigation, cases were “los[ing] their boundaries and becom[ing] part of a 
‘litigation.’”222 Such “litigation” is amorphous and potentially spans multiple 
jurisdictions, with vast numbers of parties in mass tort cases. The systemic 
pressure to efficiently streamline thousands of related cases resulted in 
increasing “collectivization” of disputes, transforming them from individual 
claims into aggregated mass tort “litigation.”223 This melding of cases and 
blurring of the dispute’s boundaries has long been visible in the trend to 
centralize mass torts, to the extent possible, before a single judge in federal 
court in order to craft national solutions to “litigation” rather than relying on 
local solutions to remedy individual suits.224 MDL settlements have become 
the principle locus of this blurring of case boundaries in the current era. 
 
 222 Resnik, supra note 135, at 5, 50. 
 223 Id. at 50–51.  
 224 See id. at 55 (“Federalization reflects the growing perception that problems raised in many litigations 
are about harms suffered by people all over the country.”). 
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The vanishing utility of Rule 23 in mass torts is creating pressure upon 
MDL courts to oversee transjurisdictional, global settlements. Despite 
disaggregative trends in the private sector, MDL reflects pressure in the public 
courts to aggregate in the settlement phase, even as the formal authority to 
aggregate under Rule 23 has become increasingly unavailable. 
The goal of this Response has not been to situate transjurisdictional 
settlements in the boundaries of federal subject matter jurisdiction or resolve 
problems relating to the constitutional limits on federal power over state 
parties. Rather, the goal has been to identify the transjurisdictional MDL trend 
that has gone largely unnoticed by scholars and appellate courts, and connect it 
to the federalism problem in complex litigation. It responds to Professor 
Dodge’s mapping of a new branch of disaggregation by juxtaposing that 
branch to aggregative forces still at work within the federal courts. 
The emergence of the transjurisdictional MDL settlement trend illustrates 
that “aggregation” and “disaggregation” are not monolithic concepts in public 
litigation. Nor are they even poles on a continuum, where cases might be more 
or less aggregated. Rather, they are features of case management that can be 
located simultaneously within the same litigation—and magnified or 
diminished in ad hoc ways as needed to drive a case inexorably toward 
settlement. 
The vexing federalism problem nevertheless persists in ad hoc aggregate 
settlement mechanisms in MDL. Transjurisdictional global settlements can 
submerge the federalism problem beneath the overt agreement of the 
settlement parties. Such agreements allow the federalism problem to drop out 
of view, but they do not solve it. 
 
